Λογότυπο αποθετηρίου

Πλοήγηση ανά Συγγραφέα "Vlassas, Ioannis"

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
Α Β Γ Δ Ε Ζ Η Θ Ι Κ Λ Μ Ν Ξ Ο Π Ρ Σ Τ Υ Φ Χ Ψ Ω
Φιλτράρετε τα αποτελέσματα πληκτρολογώντας τα πρώτα γράμματα
Τώρα δείχνει 1 - 1 από 1
  • Μικρογραφία εικόνας
    Τεκμήριο
    Entry deterrence and confidence bias
    (2022-01-27) Vlassas, Ioannis; Βλασσάς, Ιωάννης; Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of International and European Economic Studies; Dioikitopoulos, Evangelos; Zacharias, Eleftherios; Antoniou, Fabio
    This dissertation is made for the purpose of researching how confidence biases of both incumbents and entrants can change equilibria and results in entry deterrence models. I start by analysing some important papers on the field of empirical entry deterrence industrial organization across many markets and continue with behavioural economics industrial organization papers regarding many behavioural biases that are manifested among the consumers of the market, the entrants or the incumbents and change significantly the results and the equilibria. Finally for my literature review, I focus on the overconfidence bias of entrepreneurs as well as of consumers.In the main part of my dissertation, I use three main models made by Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Dixit (1979) and Fumagalli and Motta (2013). In those models, I insert a parameter which is used in order to measure either the incumbent’s or the entrant’s bias among two types; an underconfident entrant or incumbent will have a negative number to that parameter, while an overconfident entrant or incumbent will have a positive number to that parameter. For Milgrom and Roberts (1982) I solve the full information game, the asymmetric info game with no bias and a case where the entrant has a confidence bias. For Dixit (1979) as well as Fumagalli and Motta (2013), I analyse the asymmetric info game with no bias as well as two more cases. On all 3 models, the introduction of the confidence parameter may change significantly the resulting profits of the game as well as the decisions of the players, based on the strength of the bias effect and the ease of their original choice.